Timor-Leste: Coalitions and Alliances
As
Timor-Leste heads towards it parliamentary elections on 7 July, it is
increasingly likely that no single party will receive sufficient votes
to hold an absolute majority in parliament in its own right. Despite
claims by some parties’ leaders about the extent of their impending
victory, none is likely in the manner in which it is being touted. As a
result, the next government can be expected to be formed through an
alliance or coalition of parties. While the terminology is not the
determining factor, within Timor-Leste, it is commonly assumed that a
‘coalition’ is a political agreement reached between two or more parties
prior to an election.
An ‘alliance’, on the other hand, is understood
to be where two or more parties enter into a partnership following an
election. The term ‘alliance’ has particular resonance within
Timor-Leste, reflecting Article 106.1 of the Constitution, which
specifies that the President must appoint as the Prime Minister either
the head of the party that receives the most votes or the head of an
alliance of parties that are able to form a majority in parliament. The
idea of a coalition has the immediate appeal of showing voters what
sort of political deals their preferred party will make prior to them
voting. There is a transparency in this that is not available to
post-election deal-making that can form alliances. Coalitions also come
to act more like a single party, if with internal factions, which is how
most political parties operate in any case.
The advantage of a
coalition, tending towards being a larger single party, is that it
creates a more stable political environment through consistency of
ideological alignment and by helping to consolidate voting around larger
blocs rather than a less coherent fracturing of smaller parties. More
and smaller parties may represent specific political interests more
accurately. But they also tend to become compromised by having to do
deals with other parties in order to achieve a degree of political
power. It is also a truism in democratic politics that while a
two-party political system can narrow potential political options, it
tends to offer voters a fairly clear either/or voting proposition, which
in turn implies greater political stability. One need only look at the
outcome of the 2012 elections in Greece to see the type of political
impasse that can arise when there are a number of smaller parties that
are deeply divided over key political issues. It is such chaotic
political circumstances in the past that have led, in Weimar Germany in
the 1930s, to an increase in presidential control over the political
process, ending up with the suspension of civil liberties and the
ascension of a dictator.
Similarly, as a consequence of political
incoherence in France in the 1950s, it changed its constitution to
increase the powers of the president from being largely ceremonial to
making the system semi-presidential, with extensive presidential powers
for the first years of the transition. It is unlikely that Timor-Leste
will fall into political chaos as a result of its numerous small
parties, primarily because it is not facing a major crisis over which
the parties do not agree. But the potential for political chaos does
remain larger rather than smaller while numerous parties exist. The
reason for Timor-Leste’s numerous small parties is its proportional
representation political system. This ensures that voters do not feel
disenfranchised by being forced to vote for one of a smaller number of
larger parties they might not feel political sympathy for. But this
system does encourage the existence of more and necessarily smaller
parties than is otherwise politically ideal.
The main driver for
maintaining a proportional representation system is to ensure that local
political control does not consolidate in the hands of local power
holders, as is possible under a direct representation system. But the
leaders of the smaller parties also have a much greater chance of being
elected under a proportional model. This self-interest is also the main
driver behind party leaders not wanting to enter into coalitions ahead
of elections. Party leaders believe that if they commit prior to an
election, their supporters may come to believe they are not voting for
their favourite party but, in effect, from the major party in the
coalition. There is an element of accuracy to this assumption. As part
of a pre-arranged coalition, the party leaders would also lose their
capacity to bargain for ministerial positions and other influence
following an election. So they tend to want to wait and then, they hope,
capitalise on their vote. However, being in a coalition means that the
bargaining for post-election position takes place not on the basis of
votes, but on the basis of agreement. In 2007, based on the first round
presidential election results, the Democratic Party, for example, looked
as though it would have a strong bargaining position after the
parliamentary elections.
However, its vote significantly declined in the
parliamentary elections, along with some of its bargaining power. The
real question in 2012 will be, however, not how well presidential
representatives did in the first round of voting, but what deals can be
offered by the larger parties as they try to bring together a majority
of seats in the new parliament. The two, or possibly three, main parties
will each have their own agenda which, depending on the final alignment
of parties in parliament, will produce very different political
outcomes for Timor-Leste. It may be, as some observers, think, that
there will be few surprises arising from the parliamentary elections and
that the shape of the next government is relatively predictable.
However, numerous smaller parties and the potential for opportunism,
shifting loyalties and political revenge, Timor-Leste’s political
process may yet throw up a surprise outcome.
Dili
- MLP: Komisaun Nasional Eleisaun (CNE) hala’o ekontru urjente ho
Partidu CNRT hodi ko’alia konaba ba fundus agrariasaun ne’ebé mak foin
dadauk hala’o iha Sentru Konvensaun Dili (CCD).